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“Reality is a mess in China”–Jia Zhangke
Social reality of postsocialist China can only be described in polysemic terms 
bearing contradictory or at least conﬂicting connotations.  The phantasmagoric na-
ture and the immeasurable dimension of this historical condition make it an 
inﬁnitely challenging object of study for anyone interested in any aspect of contem-
porary China.1)  The past three decades or so brought drastic changes to China that 
have fundamentally altered formations of the social structure and the individual’s 
position and function in this structure, forcing Chinese people to re-orient them-
selves in the way they experience the world and interact with each other.  The tri-
umph of global capitalism at “the end of history” brings China an enormous explo-
sion of energy with which the ordinary Chinese have marched forward toward 
accumulating greater amount of wealth and experiencing greater satisfactions of 
pleasure.  It has also impacted essential moral, ethical standards and thinking hon-
ored by conventional wisdom and habit, ushered in different sets of values, beliefs 
and practices, many of which are potentially more problematic than beneﬁcial.
In this paper I would like to examine postsocialist China from two important as-
pects, namely the family in disintegration and the workings of the body politics that 
exploit the weak and encourage the return of many repressed desires of the previous 
regime.  By using cinematic lens as a tool and Beijing as focus, this paper intends to 
ask pertinent questions regarding how the human subject struggles to re-deﬁne the 
meaning of moral agency and re-negotiate various power relations in order to make 
sense of a tumultuous and mundane interiority, and an equally devastating exterior 
formed in sharp contrast between polished, smooth industrial steel and concrete and 
pathetic, cast-away grey bricks.  It discusses how the new urban Chinese cinematic 
discourse encompasses contrasting emotional and political strategies, producing a 
wide range of aesthetic experiences of real or imagined reality of China from gentle 
nostalgia to critical reﬂectivity.
Tracing historical changes that have underlain the ideological workings of the 
Chinese Communist Party since its beginning, a study by Jiwei Ci articulates the 
philosophical logic with which the Chinese revolution experiences a three-fold 
movement, proceeding from an idealistic utopianism to a devastating nihilism and 
then toward a hedonism.2)  Along this path that leads from “faith to cynicism” China 
has gained tremendously in terms of material wealth and yet, as Ci speculates, the 
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Chinese collective consciousness, germinated from a utopian spirit, a belief in the 
eventual fulﬁllment of the communist ideal, remains deeply unsatisﬁed and is forced 
to grapple with “an extremely complex mixture of motives and tensions–innocent 
optimism, exuberant energy, proud nationalism, personal ambition, outright igno-
rance and irresponsibility.”3)
Under these circumstances how do the ordinary Chinese people experience reali-
ty is a question that elicits numerous answers, none deﬁnite and often ambiguous. 
After all, when the system from which one derives “shared meanings to interpret 
and make sense of the world” is undergoing unpredictable changes, conventionally 
accepted signiﬁers will also change their signiﬁed meanings.4)  To comprehend this 
reality is difﬁcult because of the sheer scale of things and the complexities it in-
volves.  Any particular outlook will depend on factors such as locality, profession or 
job categories, educational background, political aspirations, or the inﬂuence of 
guanxi (social connections).  In terms of cultural representations, any perceived reali-
ty could vary from real or authentic, to false or imagined.  A good example is Bei-
jing, now recognized as a global megacity on par with Shanghai–the two “dragon-
heads” of twenty-ﬁrst century China.  In the past three decades Beijing has 
undergone changes that literally and metaphorically make the city unrecognizable 
in many ways.  The shift of Beijing’s cityscape and its symbolic meanings is emblem-
atic of changes that have been going on in China since economic reforms began in 
the late 1970s.  Indeed “revolution” would not be an exaggeration to describe Chi-
na’s recent drive toward modernization and to pursue global capital.5)
Studies on postsocialist China’s development into socialist capitalism have in gen-
eral pointed to its most essential feature, i.e. it is a ﬁercely expanding and erosive 
process of urbanization.  “(Chairman) Mao’s mandate that the countryside encircle 
the cities has been irrevocably reversed during the past three decades in China,” ob-
serves Robin Visser in her study on the meaning and impact of this new communist 
strategy to modernize a huge nation.6)  This process of urbanization/modernization 
generates entire “new ways of seeing and perceiving the world.”7)  “The world” refers 
more to cities than the vast countryside that still inhabits the majority of China’s 
population.8)  Chinese ﬁlms produced in the past three decades conﬁrm this trend of 
gravitating toward urban areas.  Films that have deﬁned Chinese cinematic aesthet-
ics by the ﬁfth Generation directors, such as Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige, tend to 
focus on rural experience.  Red Sorghum, The Story of Qiuju, Yellow Earth and To Live 
easily come to mind.  It has been assumed the Chinese rural countryside “deﬁned 
the Chinese way of life,” and “was a metaphor for genuine Chinese society.”9)  On 
the contrary, in Chinese cultural imagination, cities are seen as inauthentic, suspi-
cious and even parasitical.  However, the younger generation, i.e. the Sixth Genera-
tion, ﬁlmmakers such as Wang Xiaoshuai, Zhang Yuan, and Jia Zhangke, tend to sit-
uate themselves in urban centers of China that have been completely transformed 
by market economy.10)  Beijing Bicycle, In the Heat of the Sun, Beijing Bastards, Suzhou 
River–the “urban milieu” has captured a generation of ﬁlmmakers’ imagination 
and inspired a new urban ﬁlm aesthetics that is distinctly individualistic in terms of 
style and concern, but decidedly postsocialist in their outlook.11)
In this paper I use three ﬁlms by young directors of China to illuminate contrast-
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ing postsocialist realities in China, via Beijing.12)  Zhang Yang’s Sunﬂower (2005) is a 
mainstream popular ﬁlm follows a family in Beijing from the 1960s to the 1990s.  Li 
Yu’s Lost in Beijing (2007) has been banned by Chinese authorities for political rea-
sons.13)  Jia Zhangke’s The World (2004), has received critical claim for its non-senti-
mental look into the lives of migrant workers stuck in Beijing World Park, which 
opened in 1993 and showcases miniature replicas of famous sites in the world.  From 
melodramatic exaggeration, nostalgic sentimentalism to bleak realist documentary 
style, these ﬁlms offer more than a glimpse into ways of engagement that contempo-
rary Chinese cinema does with postsocialist reality and its discontents.
Sunﬂower captures a “visually correct” imagery of Beijing’s recent political and 
cultural affair with the siheyuan (courtyard houses), its two thousand year history lit-
erally unchanged until China’s embrace of marketization.14)  The unassuming and 
calming grey walls and roof tiles of the siheyuan extend and blend into a humbling 
contrast to the imperial red and yellow at the center of this great city.15)  As a me-
tropolis of enduring imperial and socialist legacies, Beijing has witnessed and expe-
rienced numerous historical transformations initiated by each new political regime, 
and yet it is the “capitalist revolution” in the recent past that proves the most power-
ful and spectacular.  The “socialist market economy” implemented in the late 1970s 
rejuvenated a collective energy repressed by years of “postponed satisfaction” for 
material comfort and an asceticism touted as necessary to realize the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s idealist, utopian project.16)  This energy ﬁnds release through two an-
tithetical and codependent forces: to build and to demolish.  The Chinese character 
chai (demolition) has been an inseparable part of Beijing’s cityscape for couple de-
cades.  Represented in numerous contemporary Chinese art forms, mostly notably 
by Wang Jinsong and Zhang Dali, chai is a powerful postsocialist symbol of the spirit 
of the time, a social progression and cultural impasse signaling tension and anxiety. 
The city in ruins has informed an “uncanny ruin aesthetics” that becomes the domi-
nant cultural expression of this particular human condition.17)  What exactly, 
though, has been demolished and replaced?  What is the price paid for that which is 
built?  What has been sacriﬁced and who gains in this new march toward wealth 
and pleasure?
Sunﬂower centers on a siheyuan family of three whose hutong is located around the 
Houhai, an old neighborhood with strong traditional connotations in Beijing.  Span-
ning more than three decades of time, the ﬁlm delineates the story of this family 
with several speciﬁc markers of time: 1967, 1976, 1987, and 1999, highlighting for 
the audience the need for historical awareness.  The ﬁlm is a family drama narrated 
by the son, who was born in 1967.  The central conﬂict begins with the return of the 
sent-down painter father shortly before the end of the Cultural Revolution.  Jobless, 
and having lost mobility in his right hand, the father nonetheless forces his son, an 
only child, to become a painter like himself.  The second conﬂict that shakes the 
harmony of this family centers on abortion and giving birth.  The third revolves the 
mother’s unquenchable desire to “zhu loufang” (live in high-rise apartment build-
ings).
The ﬁrst two of these three main conﬂicts are common, even “trite,” motifs in 
modern Chinese literary and visual representations.  In this ﬁlm they receive a bit of 
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a twist, with the intention to make the speciﬁc timeframe clearly identiﬁable.  The 
father-son embattlement accelerates to the point of bust when the father physically 
drags the son off a soon-to-take off train heading to Shenzhen.  This is shortly after 
one of Deng Xiaoping’s seminal visits down south: market economy has taken off. 
Like millions of other Chinese, the son is anxious to join the “xiahai” (quit state 
guaranteed job and seek business related employment) army to make big bucks.  In 
the son’s view, this is a much better choice of life than the one prescribed by his fa-
ther: art school then artist, i.e. college education and a stable job.  At the center of 
this conﬂict lie fundamental moral and ethical differences: the father’s idealism and 
asceticism are suspended by the son’s practical approach to life.  The stacks of mon-
ey hidden inside the son’s pillowcase speak volumes: now monetary gain as a goal of 
life is not only accepted but also legitimately encouraged.18)
One of the functions of families in conventional China is to ensure the family line 
continues.  The parents in this ﬁlm are infuriated when told about a decision to 
abort a fetus: “To give birth to a son for us is Heaven’s sanction–perfectly justiﬁed!” 
The children insist that this is a private matter that needs only concern themselves. 
This kind of individualistic sentiment departs miles away from the conventional dic-
tates of ﬁlial obligation that children have toward their parents.  Family values in the 
traditional sense begin to loose its meaning.  Virtues such as ﬁlial piety and even re-
spect have lost ground to the younger generation’s emphasis on how “I” feel and 
think.  It is clear that these fundamental differences are affecting their way of engag-
ing with their world, their view of life and their relationship with their own self.  The 
ﬁlm, however, chooses the more lighthearted path by never allowing the son to real-
ly break free on his own terms.  In other words, family here still exists, in a state of 
disaccord but not yet being displaced.
The mother’s hysteric effort to move into a high-rise apartment is time speciﬁc of 
postsocialist China.  To be able to “zhu loufang” has been one of the earlier symbols 
of material comfort and status coveted by the ordinary Chinese and made possible 
by the new economic policies.  In the ﬁlm, it is this newly found or “rediscovered” 
pursuit of pleasure that splits this family, ﬁrst superﬁcially on paper, then in the real 
sense.  After the mother moves into a new apartment, we see the father meandering 
among the hutong ruins in the late 1990s, alone, feeding stray cats and making an ef-
fort to regain his lost artistic ability to draw.  The father drifts into his own lonely 
world ﬁlled with nostalgic longings for the warmth the family fails to provide.  The 
father’s eventual decision to disappear from the now dilapidated siheyuan where all 
other neighbors have moved out is a melodramatic yet weak gesture of meanings 
that are not entirely transparent.
The father clearly senses discomfort and confusion, if not total loss of meaning, in 
a new world where belief systems, Confucian or communist (the ﬁlm never makes it 
an issue regarding where the father stands in terms of political ideology) can no lon-
ger serve as stimuli for living.  Is his disappearance protest, escape, acceptance of 
defeat and failure or recognition that he has not been a “good” father?  The ﬁlm 
seems reluctant to explain the meaning of the father’s ﬁnal act or what symbolic 
meaning the father really represents.  Ambiguity might be a strategy to “neutralize” 
a thorny question about who our Father is.  Is the father’s exit into obscurity a sug-
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gestion that those virtues symbolized by the father’s goodness, i.e. uprightness, hon-
esty, endurance and incorruptible character, simply can not survive in a material 
world where success and status (which assumed to contain goodness) are measured 
only in monetary terms?
Other cultural representations of China in the ﬁlm also reveal problematics of 
this neutralizing attempt.  “Xiangyang” (meaning sunﬂower), for example, is the 
son’s name and the title of the ﬁlm, which carries a very “politically correct” conno-
tation for anyone grew up during Mao years.19)  What is the intention to depoliticize 
this powerful political icon by deliberately associate it with nature at the end of the 
ﬁlm?  The son succeeds as an artist in the ﬁlm which uses the real paintings by 
Zhang Xiaogang, one of the most successful and highest earning contemporary art-
ists, whose paintings based on old family photos have become one of the most ex-
hibited and visual postmodern icons of China’s art scene.  The glazed eyes of the 
subject in each of the paintings are devoid of depth, individual identity or emotion. 
They look but don’t see; they are suspended in a startled state of being, as if not 
ready to be fully awakened from a reverie for a past that was really an imagined fa-
milial sphere of existence.  The photos are taken in the Cultural Revolutionary 
years but are innocuous: it is difﬁcult to associate them with violence, lawlessness, 
and utter chaos that were characteristics of the era.  Watching photos of familiar 
looking people watching us, a feeling of nostalgia arises, even though there is a 
strong sense of falseness present.  The endless repetitious of the same faces, eyes, 
uniforms evoke a hollowing space in the human psyche.  Nostalgia for an imagined 
past which is simultaneously denied by collective amnesia testify to the unconscious 
need to ease the pain by remembering and forgetting at the same time.  The ﬁlm, 
like Zhang’s art, reminiscences about a lost past but refrains from making critical in-
quiry into deeper range of emotions in regard to the loss of this past, apart from 
melodramatic sentimentalism.
Studies on China’s urbanization have focused on three most shattering effects of 
this process: family displacement, gentriﬁcation and social stratiﬁcation.20)  Li Yu, 
Chinese CCTV anchor turned independent ﬁlmmaker captures the chaotic feelings 
brought by disparate realities that postsocialist China engenders in her Lost in Bei-
jing.  The ﬁlm examines ruthlessly how Chinese people are caught in the new capi-
talist dream that proves to be more fragile and temporary than envisioned.  Here 
the crowded yet cozy, disorderly yet humane, hutong alleyways have become forgot-
ten ghettos of the marginalized urban underbelly, which consists mostly of displaced 
migrant workers who come from the countryside or small towns less favored by the 
process of marketization.
The haves, symbolized by The Boss of the Golden Basin Massage Parlor and his 
leisure–occupied wife, live in a brand new high-rise apartment furnished with glit-
tering luxurious items.  The have-nots, a young migrant couple, cramp into a tiny 
one-room living space, barely equipped with basic facilities, tucked away in a run-
down hutong.  The Boss (which is how he is addressed to in the ﬁlm) and wife, also 
not from Beijing, are among the luck few of the ﬂoating population who has made it 
big with a ﬂourishing and ludicrous massage business that employs dozens young 
and hard-working women who are mostly migrants.  One of these is the heroine of 
192
the ﬁlm, Pingguo.  Ankun, Pingguo’s husband, is a migrant worker who cleans high-
rise building windows, a job that belongs to one of the so-called “Three D Jobs”, i.e. 
dirty, dangerous and demeaning.  Knowing the nature of these jobs and the fact that 
they are disdained by the urban populace does not stop large number of migrant 
workers compete for a position, after all they get to live and feel like one of the ur-
ban crowd, regardless of how superﬁcially or temporarily.21)
Despite shocking disparity between their status, luxury apartment vs. ghetto, 
Mercedes-Benz vs. bicycle, dinning with wine and dance ﬂoor vs. street food from 
the vendors, the two couples become entangled in an uncanny fashion that is symp-
tomatic of the human condition of postsocialist China, in which messy and arbitrary 
formations of relationships and conﬂicts can make pivotal changes.  The problem ar-
rives when The Boss rapes Pingguo, taking advantage of her in a vulnerable mo-
ment.  Drunk, she initially mistakes The Boss for her husband, but soon realizes the 
mistake.  Her protest meets with more force from The Boss.  By chance Ankun 
cleans the very window from outside and witnesses the incident.  The furious Ankun 
makes a big scene but is thrown out of the parlor.  He goes home and forces himself 
on Pingguo–the two painfully twisted bodies speak of a dream suddenly shattered 
by a cruel reality which consists of pain, anger, regret, confusion, despair, and agony 
–rarely a sex scene carries so many mixed feelings showing raw energy wasted as a 
futile performance of protest.  Pingguo becomes pregnant and the two men make a 
deal to do a blood test to determine the identity of the real father.  The Boss is happy 
to pay a large sum of money for the pregnant mother to secure a son: his wife being 
infertile has been the only defect of this perfectly happy nouveaux riches family. 
Sex and money, the corrupt version of hedonistic pursuit of wealth and pleasure, be-
come crudely intertwined in a new power structure and receive an honest interroga-
tion in this ﬁlm.
In fact, the opening shot of the ﬁlm already presents an unsentimental look at the 
sex and money game which has become part and parcel of the new postsocialist re-
ality, made possible by marketization of all forms of services, social or corporeal. 
The camera follows the back of a young woman, cruising through a lively eating 
place in daytime and ends up in a private room upstairs where The Boss waits with 
a sexual desire needs to be fulﬁlled and a wallet full of cash.  When Ankun goes to 
The Boss’s wife for blackmail, she informs him in a matter of fact tone: money is not 
a problem for The Boss, it’s all about face.  She proceeds to make a business like sug-
gestion: “Why don’t you return him what he has given you?”  The next shot cuts to 
the wife riding on top of Ankun.  Yet neither is able to enjoy the sex act, both bitter 
and desperate about the situation.  It’s a performance of discontent which both know 
will be meaningless since they are both in the weaker position to negotiate: her be-
ing the materially dependent and infertile wife, him being a marginal ﬁgure by any 
measure.  Sex and money become distastefully connected and can even be fatal for 
some.  Xiaomei, Pinguo’s co-masseur transforms radically from an innocent small 
town girl who refuses to be touched by her licentious customer to a heavily made-
up, wildly partying girl who is more likely making money by prostituting herself and 
ends up dead after being robbed and attacked.22)  Beijing is seen as a city that cor-
rupts.  Loss of innocence is a given in this postsocialist environment where money 
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alone rules.
The ﬁlm offers another telling insight into how people negotiate their identities, 
rights, claims to relationships in a new power structure where blatant consumer mo-
rality is able to commodify everything and replace the old morality of socialism as 
well as Confucianism.  People’s interaction with others is reorganized in terms of a 
new relationship determined by capital in a new master-servant order.23)  When the 
two couples decide to peacefully resolve the issue regarding the unborn baby, they 
reach a private agreement without seeking any legal interference: a written docu-
ment is simply signed in red ink by the two parties.  The sense of justice maintained 
informally like this is based on the value of commodity, in this case Pingguo’s womb 
and the baby inside, assessed and agreed upon in the private domain.  Such conve-
niently conceived strategy mocks the legal system and reinforces the hierarchy in 
this power relationship.  It also brings back pre-liberation memories when women’s 
bodies were traded openly as commodities.  The return of the repressed takes an un-
canny route.
Later in the ﬁlm when the police comes to give The Boss the DNA test result from 
the new-born baby, The Boss tears it up while the police timidly murmurs: “This is 
your own business…”24)  In the end this agreement of transaction of money and a 
baby fails to bring fulﬁllment on either side.  Both couples break up and both men’s 
dreams to be the proud father of a son shatter to pieces.  Family can no longer repre-
sent a “cultural ideal consisting of a set of norms that motivate the individual in his 
or social practices.”25)  Chinese have always viewed the family as an ideal social in-
stitution that serves to stabilize society since it nurtures relationships at the funda-
mental level through tradition honored ethical codes that provide guidance of prop-
er behaviors and attitudes.  Now it becomes a temporary formation, at best an 
illusory oasis where “drifters” seek short-term comfort.  Marriage becomes a deal of 
convenience.  The already displaced family is disintegrated, regardless of its social 
stratum.  The English title of the ﬁlm then refers to a loss of multiple meanings: 
Pingguo’s and the baby’s physical disappearance, money and relationships, and 
something more profound like trust or even love.  The irony that the birth of a son 
breaks up two families is a big contrast to Sunﬂower where the birth of a son ﬁrst 
symbolizes happiness in the family sphere, the second time brings back a self-exiled 
father in spirit–family values are reconﬁrmed rather than discarded.
In Lost in Beijing, not only families the city itself is also displaced.  The neatly or-
ganized, harmonious structures of hutong have given way to building projects that 
defy the imperial capital’s digniﬁed and symbolic existence as political and cultural 
center of China.  The carefully laid out city plan is now dismantled, and the city is 
up for sale in large chunks.  Emboldened by the new economic policy to modernize 
and catch up with the west, Beijing is at a risk losing its enduring “historic identi-
ty.”26)  The 2008 Summer Olympics serves to justify the Beijing boom, a crazy and 
endless game of demolition and construction.  At the same time high-rise apart-
ments become new living quarters, mega scale projects, shopping malls, ﬁnance cen-
ters, museums, entertainment facilities have given Beijing a face-lift, a new identity 
deﬁned by “landmarks by international star architects” and the impulse to change 
Beijing into a “theme park of world architecture.”27)
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Indeed it is now a “city of performance” driven by a singular desire to show off its 
global megacity appeal.28)  The historic cultural heritage of a certain Beijing ﬂavor 
or style whose close approximity to Chineseness has been replaced by a cosmopoli-
tan design closely linked to business interests and consumer demands.  The “nation-
al identity” showcased with such grander and conﬁdence in the 2008 Olympics in a 
way is a gross exaggeration and gloss over of the realities of Beijing: a hybrid, frag-
mented and fractured space rather than a culturally integrated place of locality.29) 
Beijing exists in multiple realities felt and experienced differently by a socially 
stratiﬁed people who no longer share the same political right to claim the meaning 
of existence.  If globalization manifests itself in terms of the changing experience of 
time and space, Beijing offers a good example of how this experience is felt in an un-
even and unfair manner.  Cinematic mappings of Beijing also involve shifting spaces 
and re-engaging with spatial identity.
Jia Zhangke is one of a few contemporary Chinese ﬁlmmakers who consistently 
voices serious concerns of the state of being of China.  Jia has produced ﬁlms docu-
menting forgotten or ignored realities of China’s xiangzhen (small towns) in the pro-
cess of modernization.30)  Jia’s ﬁlms are very much concerned with giving the “right 
of discourse” to the less privileged.31)  His ﬁlms are known for their realist style, 
which has been referred to as “docu-realism” and share many similarities with main-
land China’s independent documentary movement that aims to approach realities of 
China from close range.32)  The World diverges from his usual xiangzhen milieu and 
ventures to Beijing’s popular theme park.  Filled with miniatures of world famous 
structures, the park employs many migrant workers from all over China, even dis-
placed Russian women as dancers.  “A migrant laborers’ village”, the park is unlike 
any other traditional parks associated with Beijing.  It’s entirely foreign: from Taj 
Mahal to the no longer existent World Trade Center, it satisﬁes an illusion that here 
one becomes a “world citizen.”  “Give us a day and we’ll show you the world”–the 
parks’ motto shines in neon illumination, a promise to deliver a dream that will re-
main imagined mobility for the migrant workers stuck here where “boredom and 
emptiness” have a real social content.33)
Displaced and exploited, the forever-replaceable migrant workers live a life of in-
consequence.  The capitalist dream of gentriﬁcation is a distant echo, beyond grasp. 
“I don’t know anyone that has been on an airplane,” says the ﬁlm’s heroine Xiao Tao 
as a plane ﬂies over an industrial terrain of concrete and steel, abandoned or waiting 
to be utilized.  Immobilized by her lack of choices, Xiao Tao’s dream of freedom is 
so desperate and remote it can only come in the form of cartoon simulacrum on her 
cellphone.  In comparison, even the displaced Russian Anne is able, at least, to ﬂy to 
Ulaanbaatar to meet up with her sister.  If the migrant couples in Lost in Beijing still 
have a vague attachment to familial values pinned to the birth of a son and a clear 
sense of a place that is called home, in The World human subjectivities assume mean-
ing and identity through constant negotiations of place.  Family is a distant memory, 
exists to fulﬁll an “imagined nostalgia.”34)  Home is a complicated “network of local-
ities,” or simply wherever there is work.35)  “Drifting” becomes a reality and serves 
as a ﬁtting metaphor for a state of being permanently at the mercy of capitalist devel-
opment.  Relationships are barely sustained, even when love involves.  “These days 
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you can’t trust anyone, not even me” is the reply of Xiao Tao’s boyfriend, both on a 
hotel bed at a most intimate moment of their love life.  Marriage still symbolizes 
happiness but of a kind suspicious of impulsion for ownership, as another young cou-
ple demonstrates.
Beijing in Li Yu’s ﬁlm is a place full of potential to corrupt the innocent, here it is 
a world where easy ways of making an extra buck seem to have erred the common 
sense judgment of what is right and wrong.  Erxiao casually lifts notes of RMB from 
each purse left in the backstage as if it is an entitlement that comes along to him as 
the key-holding security guard.  Xiao Tao’s boyfriend Taisheng, also a security 
guard at the park, makes handsome amount of money making fake ID cards for a 
dubious Song with such ease and even pride–his trendy black leather jacket and 
smooth waltz steps are markers of someone on the way to success, big city style. 
There is an ironic moment that brings out Taisheng’s internal confusion, or a contra-
diction emblematic of the postsocialist time of China.  Upon learning that Erxiao, a 
tongxiang (coming from the same village), is caught thieving money, Taisheng strikes 
him in anger, scolding him with a typically old-fashioned remark of reprimand of a 
father ﬁgure: “How shameless!  Useless thing!”  Taisheng’s sense of loss of face on 
behalf of his native place is genuine, but it comes out as a weak and comic mockery 
of his own engagement with something much more ludicrous and harmful, not to 
mention criminal in nature.  “The moral state of being of our nation” that Jia intends 
to reveal is a state of schizophrenia in which human agency to reason is only a con-
tingent effort for moral and emotional integrity.36)  Jia is not interested in offer “mor-
al condemnations” on the state of being of the underprivileged people, his “tell-no-
lies” camera simply speaks directly to the audience in a honest voice that is calmly 
effective because of its lack of embellishment.37)
Sunﬂower, Lost in Beijing and The World have shown cinematic mappings of Beijing 
in its transformation into a postsocialist global city necessarily confront fundamen-
tal losses of many kinds: communities, family relationships and “virtues” cultivated 
and idealized in Confucian ethic codes such as fatherly love and brotherly affection, 
trust among friends, as well as loyalty in ideals.  Instead, desires for mobility and 
choice, not to mention wealth and pleasure become the driving life force.  In place 
of the vacuum left by idealism, hedonism emerges, repressed desires return, reiﬁed 
and magniﬁed into numerous forms, many of which relate to the ever more power-
ful presence of body politics.38)  Under the communist regime, body politics has 
been associated strongly with various forms of state control.  Bodies, desires and 
sexuality are subject to disciplines enforced in top-down policies to ensure social 
and moral orders are in place, consistent with state ideology.  The numerous “re-ed-
ucation” campaigns on the one hand intend to align the thinking mind and con-
sciousness of the populace with state ideology; on the other hand they clearly exer-
cise power over the body to the extent of abuse, let alone exploitation.  The 
politically and sexually neutral Maoist uniforms, for example, only serve to conceal, 
and simultaneously draw attention to, the problematics of the body, which affects 
both genders.
In Sunﬂower body politics is played out in all of the main characters’ lives.  Sever-
al scenes in the earlier part of the ﬁlm show the father’s masculine body, clad in tank 
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top, obvious result from years of manual labor in the countryside.  Now working as 
an earnest carpenter at home, he shows off skills learned in the re-education cam-
paign.  He also has lost muscle power in his right hand–his lifeline as a painter.  As 
a victim of ideology gone astray, the father survives and even triumphs, and yet he is 
a conventional patriarchal father with a strong belief in an ethic code, which grants 
him absolute power over his son, body and soul.  “Just because I am your father,” he 
tells his son after forcing the son’s girlfriend to abort his fetus.  Here body politics 
works inside the familial framework that has supported the patriarchal authority to 
exploit the younger generation, and especially women, as legitimate and correct.
In postsocialist China as family units loosen, state ideology shifts and becomes 
more “tolerant” or eager to overlook areas of dubious nature, human body becomes 
a highly proﬁtable commodity.  The body has acquired an unprecedented presence 
as a cultural signiﬁer yet whose meanings remain undetermined and ambiguous. 
Popular or avant-garde cultural productions of the last couple decades from main-
land China, whether ﬁction, performance art, photography, advertising, or ﬁlms, 
easily provide a catalog of body-centered imageries and leitmotifs.39)  The shocking-
ly honest, intentionally twisted or ugly representations of the body in postsocialist 
Chinese cultural scene testify to a need to reconsider deeper implications of body 
politics.
Unlike Sunﬂower, Lost in Beijing shows body politics in postsocialist China has be-
come so powerful and prevalent it enables commodiﬁcation in ways that are danger-
ously destructive.  Sex, the womb, the fetus are all crudely traded for cash and a 
false sense of meaning, satisfaction and justice.40)  The numerous explicit and implic-
it sex scenes, the horrifying abortion episode, the transformation of Xiaomei, all 
prove the human body is rarely associated with deep passion or warm affection. 
The only exception is the sex scene of Pingguo and Aukun at the beginning, where 
there is a feeling of honest spontaneity that speaks of youthful energy.  Yet even here 
there is no escape of the omnipresence of body politics that comes in the form of iro-
ny: Aukun confesses that he has learned the standing position from a porn ﬁlm.41) 
In the rest of the ﬁlm the body struggles in agony, or performs to the value attached.
The ﬁlm rightly includes both genders in the game of the body but eventually 
makes a gendered statement through Pingguo and The Boss’s wife, both end up 
slightly wiser though hardly winners.  Pingguo gains moral and emotional agency to 
become her own person (and her baby’s mother); the wife ﬁnds courage to extin-
guish a relationship sustained by money and comfort.  The ﬁlm, however, refuses to 
take a radical feminist position or simplify a very complicated matter: both women 
willingly take a large sum of money from the men.  It remains unclear if this money 
signiﬁes anything more than deserved payment for loss, security or reminder of a 
narrow escape from total destruction of self when happiness in the form of family 
ties has disappeared.
The World opens with Xiao Tao, the migrant dancer freshly made-up and cos-
tumed to go on the stage in the theme park to perform among several dozen young 
women (as well as a handful of men) in Las Vegas style spectacles that require not so 
much dancing skills than beautiful sexy bodies, decorated, scantly clad or fabulous-
ly adorned to meet a wide range of whimsical fancies of an anxious and generously 
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paying audience.  The camera shoots onto Xiao Tao’s face and upper body, follow-
ing her through the backstage, screaming: “Who’s got some band aid?”  As the ﬁlms 
proceeds, Xiao Tao’s body is put through more severe tests: a chance to exchange 
her service for glamour and a trip to Hong Kong, a command to give up her body to 
her boyfriend as proof of her love and devotion.  Xiao Tao resists the temptation to 
compromise.  In her there inhabits a certain moral integrity and quiet strength that 
keeps her from cashing in on her desirable body as some of her follow dancers have 
done: Anne gets money and a roommate gets a promotion.  The bathroom scene in 
the gilded karaoke building brilliantly puts Xiao Tao in contrast to the norm: girls 
obviously serve as more than companions at parties come here to vomit and regain 
their posture, then to receive swabs of cash.  Xiao Tao meets Anne, re-packaged to 
meet the occasion.  The two embrace, wordless, with tears running down Anne’s 
face and inside Xiao Tao.  The biggest irony, though, waits for Xiao Tao: right after 
asking her boyfriend to marry her, she chances upon a text message from Qun, 
Taisheng’s secret and very attractive Wenzhou lover, who has also been displaced 
and separated from a husband in pursuit of the capitalist dream in France.
Like Li Yu, Jia zhangke also makes it clear that body politics exploit women and 
men equally if in different manners, all succumb to the new logic of market capital-
ism.  Several bleak documentary-like shots in The World, in typical Jia fashion, con-
front this reality.  In one scene, the camera pans over the newly constructed groups 
of high-rise buildings, while several dozens of men, in uniformed collectivity 
identiﬁable only by their helmets and metal lunch boxes, walk in silence past these 
industrial forests that offer luxuries beyond the means of the likes of them.  Human 
subjectivity is nearly completely erased to the level of irrelevancy.  An old man 
walks in the shadow cast by the fake Eiffel Tower, slowly as if crushed by the weight 
of the huge pile of garbage on his back that is his lifeline–we never see his face.  Er-
guniang dies in an accident at the construction site and then his taciturn farmer par-
ents come to carefully tuck away two stacks of money–no explanation is ever of-
fered regarding the cause.  Jia’s camera simply stays on the face of the parents for a 
long time–it does not moralize nor condemn.  Yet it is moments like this that are 
rare protests of an unfair system, showing the critical potential of ﬁlmic discourse.
In this new urban landscape men and man-made objects co-exist in disharmony. 
It is a new urban aesthetics that has replaced the tradition-honored aesthetics of Chi-
nese art that emphasizes harmony between man and nature.42)  Now it is deﬁned by 
nondescript features and imitation simulacrum: human beings become contingent 
objects in passing, reduced as source of labor or service, as mere physical being with 
potential for materialistic value.  Man and city become separate entities, forming a 
mutually replaceable and alienating self/other relationship.
The new Chinese urban cinematic aesthetics can be described as sliding along a 
pendulum of cultural expressions encompassing absences at one end and excesses at 
the other, both intricately linked to the postsocialist Chinese condition.  Cinematic 
expressions of absences relate ﬁrst of all to a strict censorship that forbids contents of 
issues of political sensitivity.  In Sunﬂower, the absences of the two Tiananmen events 
of 1976 and 1989 may make the ﬁlm politically correct, but it is hardly authentic for 
those whose experiences of these critical historic moments play crucial parts in their 
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life outlook.  The otherwise realistic representations of changes to the siheyuan in the 
ﬁlm therefore become less than genuinely felt.43)  The other forms of absences reﬂect 
a vast vacuum left by the seemingly sudden and abrupt shift in China’s ideology that 
ruthlessly favors commercialism and marketization.  The new economic success is 
achieved at the expense of dismantling values, beliefs, habits and the ways ordinary 
Chinese people interact with and experience the world: anything that deems incom-
patible with the new logic of market economy needs to go.  The permissive shift 
from ascetic self-control and refrain to excessive pursuit of wealth and pleasure en-
courages an unprecedented release of human energy to chase a new dream of hedo-
nist materialism.  This dream, however, has become an addiction for many and re-
mains an imagined freedom for others.
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